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Whether animals, especially companion animals, count as friends depends on the 
conception of friendship as well as on the conception of animals. Some accounts of 
friendship can include (other than human) animals more easily than others. I 
present an argument in favour of characterising some animal-human connections 
as friendships, and address some of the standard objections to this 
characterisation. It might seem that under any conception of friendship, 
characterising animals as (potential) friends would likely lead to better treatment of 
animals, as various kinds of ill-treatment or use would not be consistent with 
treating someone as a friend. However, concern for animal welfare typically 
extends well beyond the direct concern for our own household companions, and is a
concern for animals (or certain animals) in general, whereas friendship, by its 
nature, is particularist. There are limits to applying the concept of friendship to 
animal treatment beyond particular relationships. 
1. Introduction 
To some people, it is simply obvious that friendship with an 
animal is a full, even supreme, manifestation of everything friendship 
needs to be. Looking at actual relationships, it is hard to deny that the
relationship to a non-human companion is the (equal) strongest 
connection in the lives of some humans, temporarily or permanently 
(for compelling fictional examples, see Auster 1999; Hornung 2010). 
But some people would judge the fact that a human’s best friend 
really is a dog, cat or horse to be rather sad. They would think that 
friendship with an animal is, in some sense or other, weaker than, or 
inferior to the (possible) connections humans can cultivate together. 
There is no clear consensus about animals as friends. 
I focus on companion animals, also known as pets, as these seem
to be the clearest candidates for being called friends. Human-animal 
companionship, or pet-human cohabitation, is just one area of 
interaction between humans and animals, and it is not isolated from 
other areas.  For example, a pet might be part of a clinical trial or a 
  









work of art. On a farm, an animal might spend part of its life as a pet, 
then become food or commodity, an assistance dog might retire as a 
pet. As Tony Milligan notes, in its rich sense, being a pet means much
more than being a live animal purchased from a pet shop (Milligan 
2009). The sense at issue here encompasses those creatures with 
whom humans can share some kind of reciprocal relationship. This is
perhaps clearest with dogs and perhaps cats. 
Some philosophical attention has been paid to animal-human
friendship, but here, too there is little consensus. Some recent 
examples include Silke Shicktanz’ discussion of a range of human-
animal relationships including friendship, patronage and partnership 
models (Schicktanz 2006); Jeff Jordan’s argument for vegetarianism 
based on the unacceptability of eating potential friends (Jordan 
2001); Donna Haraway’s extensive work on the overlap or mutual co-
construction of human and non-human lives, including a rich 
exploration of shared activities like dog agility work (Haraway 2007).
Milligan has discussed animals and end of life decisions in ways that 
illuminate the depth of the connections between humans and 
animals, but resists calling these relationships “friendships” (Milligan
2009). 
Thinking about animal and human friendships offers some 
potential for understanding animals including humans. Even if 
human and animal bonds are not friendships, they are interesting as 
relationships that involve affection and/or close and sympathetic 
attention. These might show up morally important features of the 
participants, because of the kind of attentive care involved. We can 
learn about our human selves from interaction with animals. In Freya
Mathews’ words: 
emotional involvement with creatures who do not share 
our human goals and  aspirations, our systems of values, 
enables us to gain an external perspective on  those 
values. It enables us to appreciate how odd or arbitrary 
our human priorities might appear to non-human 




With respect to building understanding of animals, 
companionship can stand alongside the kind of close and long-term 
observation that ethologists recommend as basic to good 
information. Arguably, from the perspective of such relationships we 
are less likely to underestimate both the capacities of animals and, a 
moral leverage advocate might hope, undermine the associated view 
that (some) animals have lives that merit little or no protection (from 
killing, suffering, exploitation, disrespect and the like.) Satz, for 
example, discusses a non-discrimination approach to animal welfare 
(Satz 2006). 
However, caution is warranted (Spencer, Decuypere, Aerts & De 
Tavernier 2006; Tuan 1984). Pet owners might overestimate or 
distort the capacities of their animals (proximity does not guarantee a
clear view, as the history of sexist and racist views demonstrates) and 
cruelty to companion animals is widespread. More radically, it has 
been argued that pets are not animals in their own right – they are 
human artefacts or creations. The cute, decorative, sentimentalised 
pets that sometimes show up with celebrities seem to support this 
view. However, this objection has two problems. First, it trades on a 
problematic view of an authentic animal, uninfluenced by its 
environment, human or otherwise. Second, as I will argue, humans 
are shaped by animals, too, and this mutual influence is an important
aspect of animal-human friendship. 
2. Talking about Animals 
The main controversy about how to refer to household animals is
not about calling my dog my “friend,” but about the labels of “pet” 
and “owner”. For example, PETA (People for Ethical Treatment of 
Animals) have argued against the institution of pet ownership, 
pointing out that it often fails to achieve high or even minimally 
decent standards of compassion and wellbeing. Some argue that the 
term “ownership” should be replaced by “guardianship” which better 
connotes the relevant responsibilities (Hankin, 2009). Some 
jurisdictions adopt language of animal companion, some vets replace 





local vet) “pets and their people” which interestingly subverts the 
notion of ownership. The compatibility of these categories with
friendship is complex, because guardianship and pet-hood are not 
relations of equals, and are irreducibly asymmetric. We can be 
mutual friends or companions, but not really each other’s pets. 
Arguably, ownership and friendship can be compatible, but this does 
not make friendship and guardianship an easy fit. Ownership is a
multi-stranded bundle of rights, and the bundle of rights and 
responsibilities of guardianship might fit differently with friendship. 
Guardianship involves certain responsibilities, so it differs from 
typical friendship, which includes influence, but not a right to decide 
on behalf of the friend. Interestingly, there have been objections to 
the change in certain jurisdictions to “guardianship” language, often 
coming from veterinarian groups. This reflects a concern that the 
quite specific obligations of legal guardianship (in human cases) will 
carry over to the client who brings her animal to the vet – this seems 
a misguided concern as that interpretation is explicitly ruled out in 
much of the legislation (Satz, 2006). 
Another objection to “pet” and preference for “guardian” is that 
pet lacks the connotations of welfare for the animal and might be 
consistent with “convenience euthanasia” whereas “guardian” carries 
the connotation of looking out for the other’s welfare and interests.  
But Milligan sees the term differently: “The concept of pet, which 
plays a role within a life that is enriched by a relation to a non-human
other, is one which involves treating (valuing) these animals as 
unique and irreplaceable creatures” (Milligan 2009, 406).  A 
replaceable animal isn’t a pet, neither is a disposable animal. 
There does seem to be mutuality, both in affection and in 
shaping between pets and their people. Perhaps friendship requires 
mutuality, but not symmetry, and if so, pet-hood and friendship 
might be compatible. 
Milligan opts for “guardianship” and “companionship” as the 










animals. Like friendship, companionship involves some kind of 
reciprocity or mutual appreciation: 
This reciprocity need not be understood as cognitively 
demanding for the animal. An animal guardian may be 
well aware that their lifelong companion’s appreciation of 
the companionship is of a restricted sort. I will suggest 
that this supports the use of a terminology of 
companionship rather than friendship and that the latter 
involves a more demanding requirement of mutual 
understanding (Milligan 2009, 410). 
Milligan sees the human-animal relationship as deeply valuable, 
his choice to avoid the term “friendship” does not at all indicate a 
dismissive or derogatory attitude. Milligan is quite clear that 
relationships with companion animals are morally serious, for 
example, in ways that preclude thinking of pets as simply replaceable.
Conversely, some who accept the terminology of friendship seem to
have a less robust view of (some dimensions of) their moral 
importance. Kristien Hens is comfortable saying that our
relationships with animals (in particular dogs) can be friendships. 
However, she goes on to qualify these friendships. “Within a 
relationship of friendship, there are again major differences: dogs are
only for a short period of time in our lives, they are to some extent 
replaceable and they are at our mercy with regard to medical care and
euthanasia” (Hens 2009, 8). These differences show that there is no 
simple uncontroversial way to label the connections between humans
and animals, as the terms can have different connotations. 
Irreplaceability and uniqueness are important characteristics for 
relationships involving priority or partiality, whether these are 
termed friendly or companionate connections. Friendship is one such
relationship, but so are family ties, and guardianships. Pets are, in the
relevant sense, irreplaceable. Friends share non-substitutability with 
other relationships – family and other attachments, rivals and even 
enemies could be this way. So while showing non-substitutability 
does not suffice to show friendship, it appears that relationships with 
pets have at least some of the characteristics relevant to friendship. 
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3. Objections to Animal-Human Friendship 
The question about animal-human friendship is just not about 
the label, “friend,” “pet” or “guardian,” but about the intersection 
between the kind of relationship that friendship is, and the kinds of
connection that (some) humans have with (some) animals. There are 
three main objections to taking animals to be full participants in 
friendships with humans: first, the power differential is too great; 
second, the cognitive demand of friendship exceeds animal 
capacities; and third, animals are not ethical agents in the requisite 
sense (perhaps because they lack the relevant cognitive capacities). 
Does inequality of power preclude friendship? Human control 
over a pet is extensive. It includes when and what the pet eats, 
exercises, is located, breeds and so on. (This is related to seeing the 
pet as an artefact.) But animals who live in companionship with 
humans are not determined by human purposes. It might be 5 
degrees at 6:30 am, and my dog expects a walk, and holds me to 
account for making that happen. In a friendship there is give and 
take, and this can take place between humans, and between humans 
and other critters. A refusal ever to be accountable and responsive 
would rule out friendship in both cases. So a provisional answer to 
the domination objection is that there can be sufficient mutuality, or 
give and take, for friendship. (When humans interact with 
independent or wild animals, it is quite clear, in some cases, that the 
animals are not dominated. Sometimes birds interact quite 
deliberately with humans, expressing preferences for some food over 
others, demanding attention and seeming to adopt unwanted 
behaviours if their demands are not satisfied. How close such 
connections can come to friendships is not clear, but they offer an 
example of animal-human connections that arise without household 
domination.) 
The second objection is exemplified by Milligan’s claim that 
friendship is cognitively demanding in a way that animal companions
can’t achieve (Milligan 2009). Accounts of friendship that involves 







Cocking 1998) or a capacity to articulate principles will not be 
amenable to including (other than human) animals. Although the 
ascription of cognitive capacity to non-human animals varies, there 
are limits to what animals can do, or be seen to do. However, setting 
the cognitive bar very high will restrict the set of humans who can 
properly be said to participate in friendship, which is a version of the
separation problem (the challenge of separating humans from other 
animals on moral grounds, or in relation to morally significant 
practices. See McMahan 2008). Younger children, among others, will
not be friends. Alternatively including animals (and less sophisticated
humans) as friends might inform an understanding of friendship, for 
example involving mutuality, but not an equality requirement for 
friendship (Goering 2003). 
The final objection – that of moral agency – can be traced back 
to Aristotle, and remains a live objection in contemporary 
discussions. Jordan (2001) follows Aristotle’s classic analysis of
friendship in which we can be friends on the basis of pleasure, 
benefits or virtue. Jordan sees animal-human friendships as 
analogous to human-human friendships, and claims that it is 
uncontroversial that humans can befriend certain animals, in most of 
the ways that Aristotle describes. 
Jordan argues that dogs can be friends with humans, and: 
Since one can play with a dog, enjoy being with a dog, 
communicate with a dog, share things with a dog, do 
things with a dog, trust and be trusted by a dog and take 
care of a dog, it certainly looks as though one can be a 
companion-friend with a dog. Further, there appears no 
obvious reason to deny that one could even establish a
utility-friendship, or a pleasure-friendship, with a dog. 
While it is true that one cannot establish a virtue-
friendship with a dog, it does not follow that one cannot 
be a friend in any sense with a dog (Jordan 2001, 520). 
According to Jordan, following Aristotle, in each case, we also 
are concerned for our friends, not for our own sake, but for the 
friend’s sake. Many who share a household with a non-human critter 
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would think they act for the pet’s sake, and not all would always be 
deluded or self-deceived. In contrast, Spencer et al  present an
analogy between pets and other animals treated purely 
instrumentally (Spencer et al 2006). Spencer et al claim, for example, 
that a dog is forced to exercise at the owner’s whim. But in my house, 
my dog wakes me up and demands a walk, and I comply. Admittedly, 
I could perhaps arrange things so I would not be disturbed in the 
early morning, but this pattern has emerged as part of our shared life. 
This is different from a use of an animal purely for human concern, 
for example, in laboratory testing. Some of each party’s actions need 
to be plausibly called other-regarding, for example, as expressing 
affection. By these standards, humans and animals can be friends. 
There are no differences between dogs, cows, sheep, pigs and goats 
(and likely other animals) relevant to the possibility of befriending 
them, so humans can potentially befriend these animals too. 
Of the range of friendships presented by Aristotle, Jordan 
concludes that only the virtuous friendship is unavailable. Here, 
again, it is the ascription (or non-ascription) of certain capacities to 
the animal that excludes it from this kind of friendship. (As Irwin 
points out, Aristotle excludes animals from choice, but not from 
voluntary action. For animals and children, actions can be voluntary, 
but not responsible. They can’t have the ultimate rational desire for 
happiness – happiness as “the ultimate end that includes everything 
we have reason to choose for itself” (Irwin 1980, 129) and that means 
they can have only very limited decisions, not decisions about the 
whole of life.) The Aristotelian view of animals is echoed in Steven 
Sapontzis’s argument that “while many of their actions are virtuous, 
animals are not moral beings because these actions are not part of a 
moral life” where a moral life is one in which one is aiming (at an 
individual or social level) towards some ideal (or morally better) way 
of life (Sapontzis 1980, 50). In order to have such a “program of 
fulfilling an ideal,” (Sapontzis 1980, 50) a capacity for reflection is 








Perhaps Jordan and Sapontzis are too quick to conclude that no 
virtue friendship is possible between humans and others (see 
Ferguson 2004). Clearly (in my view) we can have affection and 
mutual benefit (Aristotle’s pleasure and utility friendships). The 
capacity for reflective moral thinking, and character cultivation, in 
the way Aristotle explains the aspiration to live a good life is probably 
outside the repertoire of non-humans, but it is beyond many humans 
too. That bar seems excessively high, and I think many of my 
friendships don’t involve that kind of deep or moralised conversation,
even where it is possible in some sense that they might. 
Animals seem capable of at least some degree of virtuous 
behaviour. Animals can exhibit compassion, bravery, loyalty and the 
like. One famous example is that of animals in experimental 
conditions who refuse to press the food bar if doing so will deliver a 
painful shock to a creature in the next cage, as well as the desirable 
pellet of food (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). If virtuous behaviour is 
possible, and a co-construction of some kind of shared life with goods
for both parties seems to be possible with companion animals, then 
there is no reason to exclude animals from the whole domain of 
virtue friendships. At best, there is reason merely to concede that 
some friendships involve highly interpretative and articulate 
interaction of a kind that animals don’t participate in. (The moral
value of this practice is variable: eg exhaustive “workshopping” 
aspects of my life and my friend’s, including various others with 
whom we interact could evoke more compassionate patient attitudes 
or be self-indulgent, arrogant backbiting. It is worth remembering 
that friendship can lead us morally astray (Cocking and Kennett 
2000).) 
Social support is one of the most often cited reasons for having a 
pet (Staatsa, Wallace and Anderson 2008). I think we can learn about
resilience, joy, forgiveness and the like from animal companions, and 
in some ways animals might be very well placed to be moral 
exemplars. My cat is unimpressed by various superficial things like







friends” (Mathews 2007, 16). Animals can respond to us in ways that 
differ from human responses, often on the basis of our kindness, 
sensitivity and responsiveness. (At the same time, one might think 
my cat is unashamedly out for what he can get, so I don’t mean to 
romanticise his attitudes or character.) I surmise that benefits to 
humans from animal-human relationships can include moral 
benefits.
4. Animals can be Friends, but the Moral Implications 
are Limited 
These considerations show that there is a plausible case for
thinking (at least some) animals might be friends with humans, and 
that some important objections to this characterisation can be met. 
In some cases, it might be circumstances, luck or opportunity that 
dictate who our friends or companions can be. I suspect also that 
there are differences between persons– my capacity for friendship is
best exercised in relations with non-humans, another person’s is best
expressed with other humans. If so, why think friendships between 
humans and non-humans are philosophically interesting, not just a 
topic of brute disagreement or human and non-human variability? 
For one thing, as the discussion shows, exploring the reasons why 
animals can or cannot be friends can shed light on interspecies 
relationships and on friendships and related concepts more generally. 
However, acknowledging friendship with animals is less of an 
advantage for animals than might be hoped. It might seem obvious 
that friends are treated better than non-friends, so if animals are 
considered friends, they will be better treated. But the obviousness is 
misleading here. Preferential treatment for friends does not extend to
potential friends, but rather privileges one’s actual friends. It is 
selective, and that is precisely why it can be a particularly 
problematic form of partiality. 
Some thinkers have sought to derive moral leverage from taking 
animal-human friendships seriously: if people see animals as friends, 
we can be motivated to treat them better (non-instrumentally), for 
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example, restricting or ruling out certain research or food purposes. 
Jordan uses a friendship argument to argue for vegetarianism, and 
concludes that it is wrong to eat such animals, just as it is (under 
normal circumstances) wrong to eat one’s friends (Jordan 2001). He 
shows that “if something is a possible friend…it is not a morally 
permissible foodstuff” and concludes in favour of vegetarianism 
(Jordan 2001, 311). The vegetarianism may be restricted – perhaps 
there are some animals that can’t be friends, and if so, it may be 
permissible that that one might eat them. Perhaps oysters or snails 
would be candidates. 
These kinds of “pure use” relationships with animals in which 
animals are treated more or less like things manifest at best 
indifference to the particular animal in question. Many animals used 
for food, breeding or in laboratories are treated as interchangeable, 
even disposable. The indifference to the well-being of the animals in 
question can amount to cruelty. The moral leverage thought is that 
seeing animals as friends might preclude this kind of attitude and the 
treatment it licenses. One reason it seems promising is that some 
species (including rats, dogs, rabbits) are found in family-household 
relations as well as “use” or exploitation contexts. 
Rosemary Rodd offers a second example. “Once one has seen a 
particular animal as a friendly individual it no longer becomes easy 
to regard another individual animal as a laboratory ‘tool’” (Rodd 
1985, 54). Here, Rodd is pointing to a tension between having a 
relationship based on a unique inherent value of an animal (pet, 
friend, companion) and being able to treat a very similar animal 
purely instrumentally. Becoming an animal experimenter often 
requires the adoption of that latter view.  Rodd argues that there may 
be risks in overcoming a “sentimental” sympathy for animals in order 
to overcome common scruples and inhibitions against using them in 
at least some kinds of experimental ways (Rodd 1985; see also 
McLean 2009). 
While the inconsistency shown to companions on one hand and 




significant criticism, there is a pragmatic objection to the moral 
leverage argument: we don’t seem to have progressed very far 
towards consistent conduct. As humans, we are good at 
inconsistency, bad at consistency, so an appeal to consistency seems 
unlikely to engender much change. In any case, a deeper problem is
that friendship seems to be about partial and preferential rather than 
consistent treatment, so it isn’t the right conceptual mechanism to 
motivate a general concern. 
To see this, consider again Jeff Jordan’s initially persuasive 
moral leverage argument (Jordan 2001). It is unacceptable (under 
normal conditions, for which read there are no urgent survival needs)
to eat one’s friends. Many (if not all) commonly consumed animal 
species are as capable of friendship with humans as are dogs. (Pigs, 
cows, chickens and sheep can have affectionate, playful connections). 
So we should not be eating those animals. Humans who are 
omnivores and for whom consuming animal flesh is not an urgent 
survival need should not eat meat. We are unlike wild predators who 
must eat meat or perish (compare Everett 2001, and Shapiro 2006). 
As indicated by Jordan’s title “Friends should not let friends be 
eaten,” the implications go further than human vegetarianism. 
Suppose some of our domestic animals are both friends and obligate 
carnivores. Suppose my cat and dog don’t and can’t thrive on a vegan 
diet in the way that I can. I am in charge of providing for their needs 
– they eat what they are given, they are given what I purchase for 
them. If the moral leverage argument worked, a paradoxical result 
would arise: friendship requires you to do (use animals as food) what 
friendship prohibits (use animals as food). And friendship licenses at 
least some partiality and preference for one’s actual friends above 
potential friends, so the conclusion about general treatment is 
problematic, or the argument requires me to abandon friendship with
obligate carnivores such as cats. While I don’t accept the moral 
leverage argument for vegetarianism, to the extent that there are 
compelling reasons for vegetarianism, the paradox might be 
avoidable, but not the problem. The moral cost of my friendships 






with animal companions is that I am implicated in the morally 
unjustified practice of treating potential friends as food. 
Rodd’s argument applies to actual encounters with animals and 
in these cases, extending one’s friendly attitude to interactions could 
support behavioural change (Rodd 1985). But reservations remain 
because humans so easily compartmentalise our attitudes, and on the
whole we seem more likely to use our capacity for reason to 
rationalise convenient conduct than to lift our moral game. While 
animals can be our friends, that result does not do them as much 
good as has been hoped. 
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